The true origin of the Dardanelles

This article first appeared in Fighting Times

A warship sinking at the Dardanelles 1915.

Inaccurate accounts

I have for many years been fascinated by the inaccuracies in most accounts of the Dardanelles naval campaign of early 1915. A J P Taylor will do as an example: ‘The man of most persistence won. Churchill pressed for the Dardanelles.’[1] Few authors deviate from Taylor’s neat summary of how the bombastic Churchill foisted this project on a reluctant War Council. The one problem with Taylor’s account is that it is the opposite of the truth. As the War Council minutes show, and as I will show below, Lord Kitchener, the War Minister, was that the man who initiated and drove the project forward. Not that he met much resistance. After five months of failure on the Western Front the Council were desperate for the hope of success elsewhere. After some initial hesitancy, they leapt at his suggestion.

The standard histories (with Martin Gilbert as the honourable exception) all fail to mention six key facts that are sufficient to quash these bizarre ‘it was all Churchill’s fault’ accounts. I will summarise these ‘killer facts’ before quoting from the War Council minutes in more detail:

1. The first person to suggest the attack was Lord Kitchener in a letter to Churchill dated 2 January 1915.

2. Throughout December and well into January Churchill repeatedly said that he thought that British efforts should be concentrated in the North Sea and he urged the Council to support his pet project, which was to capture the German island of Borkum. Indeed, even in May 1915, just before his dismissal, Churchill was still working on his Borkum plan.

3. In the Council meetings in early January Kitchener was the only member driving forward the Dardanelles proposal.

4. When Churchill presented Admiral Carden’s bombardment plan on 13 January to the War Council he made no recommendation that it be accepted. His tone was that of a man presenting a case that he did not believe in. (Contrast Hough’s version which says that Churchill was ‘infectiously enthusiastic’.[2])

5. The Council members willingly accepted Carden’s plan and their excitement was engendered by Kitchener’s grandiose claims for naval action at the Dardanelles –  not by Churchill’s presentation.

6. And finally, when Churchill asked the Council to confirm its commitment to the project on 28 January, he was the only person to warn of the risks.

So, in summary: Kitchener suggested the Dardanelles campaign; it was Kitchener who elaborated on what it could achieve; it was Kitchener who worked hardest to gain the Council’s consent. Somehow historians have erased him from the record and left Churchill in the dock as the wild enthusiast for a doomed campaign. So now let’s look at what really happened by delving into the minutes.

First, though, the vital letter that Kitchener sent to Churchill on 2 January 1915: ‘Do you think any naval action would be possible to prevent Turks sending more men into the Caucasus & thus denuding Constantinople[?]’[3] This is the first suggestion of a Dardanelles campaign by any member of the War Council. After the meeting Churchill asked his admiral in the Mediterranean, Sackville Carden, if he thought the ‘forcing of the Dardanelles by ships alone’ was ‘practicable’. Such an operation would ‘justify severe losses,’ he wrote.[4] This letter needs putting in its context since, at that time, Churchill was in a furious battle with his advisors over his plan to capture the German island of Borkum. He could get no support, but was refusing to let go. Inside the Admiralty he recommended against the Dardanelles, telling Admiral Lord Fisher and Admiral John Jellicoe that ‘Germany is the foe, and it is bad war to seek cheaper victories and easier antagonists.’[5] His priority was Borkum, he told Jellicoe: ‘everything convinces me that we must take Borkum as soon as full and careful preparation can be made’.[6]

Kitchener took the next step when he told the Council on 8 January that ‘the Dardanelles appeared to be the most suitable objective’ for a new front. And, before anyone had had a chance to comment, he enthused that ‘If successful, it would re-establish communication with Russia; settle the Near Eastern question; draw in Greece and, perhaps Bulgaria and Roumania; and release wheat and shipping now locked up in the Black Sea.’[7] Only the secretary, Colonel Maurice Hankey, spoke in support of the idea. In other words the Council’s first cheer-leader for the Dardanelles was Kitchener. Churchill did no more than agree ‘to study’ the proposal, but added ‘we should not lose sight of the possibility of action in Northern Europe’.[8]

Later in the meeting Churchill and Fisher asked the Council for authority to bombard Zeebrugge. This was given provided ‘it can be done without excessive risk’.[9] So at the end of the first War Council meeting to discuss the Dardanelles, the only minister to favour the operation was Kitchener. Churchill showed total indifference and maintained his enthusiasm for North Sea operations.

The Council next discussed the Dardanelles on 13 January when Churchill presented Carden’s plan, saying ‘the sense … was that it is impossible to rush the Dardanelles’ but it might be possible to ‘demolish the forts one by one’. He then read out the details of Carden’s plan but at no point did he express any opinion on either its feasibility or its desirability. Only later, after some questions, did Churchill offer his view: he was against the plan since ‘we ought not to go South until we are satisfied that we can do nothing in the North’.[10]

Meanwhile Kitchener said the action was ‘worth trying’; the rest of the Council was lukewarm. Grey preferred to do something to bring Italy into the War and Lloyd George, Chancellor of the Exchequer, wanted to attack Austria. With only one minister supporting the project and its sponsoring minister advising against it, the Council authorised the Admiralty to prepare ‘to bombard and take the Gallipoli peninsula’ in February. So far the campaign was Kitchener’s and Kitchener’s alone. On the following day Churchill authorised Carden to go ahead, with the bland words ‘The sooner you can begin the better.’[11]

It was two weeks before the Council next discussed the Dardanelles. During that time Churchill had been working hard with his staff to supply the ships and men that Carden would need, yet he gave a low-key report at the War Council on 28 January. He offered no opinion of his own, merely reporting that Carden ‘had expressed his belief it could be done’. All the enthusiasm came from the other members. Kitchener, who the members treated as near to infallible, described the attack as ‘vitally important’. Its success ‘would be equivalent to a successful campaign fought with the new armies’. The Tory MP and ex-Prime Minister, Arthur Balfour, declared that ‘It was difficult to imagine a more helpful operation.’ And Sir Edward Grey, the Foreign Secretary, opined that ‘the Turks would be paralysed with fear when they heard that the forts were being destroyed one by one’.[12] Amidst all this wild enthusiasm there was one lone voice of warning: Churchill. ‘He asked if the War Council attached importance to this operation, which undoubtedly involved some risks.’[13] No one picked up this point – the Council had already made up its mind.

On 9 February Churchill made a brief report to say that the bombardment would begin on fifteenth. Kitchener offered troops if needed. The most remarkable comment of the day was a question from Grey about trying to buy the Turks off. Hankey confirmed that negotiations were under way and in the hands of Captain William Hall, Director of Naval Intelligence in the Admiralty. (Fisher and Churchill killed off Hall’s negotiations in mid-March because, by then, they were confident of a naval victory.[14])

After the 15 February meeting the War Council rather lost interest in the Dardanelles, other than endless discussions as to which troops should be sent and whether the 29th Division could be despatched. The bombardment began on 19 February.

So, whatever the histories say, there is no evidence in the War Council minutes to support the idea that Churchill was either the architect or the promoter of the Dardanelles campaign. The truth is that it began as Kitchener’s project and became a corporate one. From 28 January onwards the Council members took the project to their hearts and cheered it on in the confident hope that it would deliver them from the miseries and disasters of the Western Front. Only after the failure at Gallipoli and the humiliation of withdrawal did they turn and dump the blame on Churchill.

© Copyright Richard Freeman.

[1] Taylor p23

[2] Hough p 151

[3] (Gilbert 1971) p.232

[4] WSC to Carden, 3 Jan 1915 in (Gilbert, Winston S Churchill, Vol III, Companion Vol 1 1972), p 367 [CP 13/65

[5] WSC to JF, 4 Jan 1915 - (Marder 1959) Letter 95, p. 121

[6] (Patterson 1966) p.118    

[7] WCo mins 8 Jan 1915

[8] WCo mins 8 Jan 1915

[9] WCo mins 8 Jan 1915

[10] War Co mins 13 Jan 1915.

[11] WSC to Carden, 14 Jan 1915 in (Gilbert, Winston S Churchill, Vol III, Companion Vol 1 1972), p 415 [CP 13/65]

[12] War Council, 11.30 am 28 Jan 1915. TNA CAB 22/1

War Council, 11.30 am 28 Jan 1915. TNA CAB 22/1.

[13] War Council, 11.30 am 28 Jan 1915. TNA CAB 22/1

[14] Freeman 2013 Unsinkable